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Recent years have witnessed an 
accelerating push to expand access to 
information on the beneficial ownership of 
corporate entities, in an effort to bring 
greater transparency to multinational 
corporation (MNC) tax strategies, identify 
personal tax-evading wealth held overseas 
and combat global networks of criminality 
and corruption. This effort remains in its 
infancy, but has made important strides: 
the G20 has called for all countries to 
develop and share registers of beneficial 
ownership, and various jurisdictions have 
begun to do so. 
Yet while this agenda has advanced 
quickly, the likely benefits of these efforts 
for low-income countries remain unclear. 
Significant thought has been given to the 
potential role of beneficial ownership 
information for anti-corruption efforts; 
substantially less detailed empirical 
attention appears to have been given to 
its likely role in facilitating tax collection, 
where the benefits may be more uncertain 
owing to problems related to data quality, 
access and the ability and willingness to 
use it effectively. 
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This brief thus begins to explore a critical 
question for governments and civil society: 
To what extent are current efforts to 
expand access to information on beneficial 
ownership likely, in practice, to enhance the 
ability of low-income countries to increase 
tax collection? 
In the absence of significant empirical 
evidence there is a risk of answers being 
driven by a combination of gut instinct, 
professional association and ideology. This 
brief correspondingly seeks to identify the 
technical and political pre-requisites of 
improved outcomes, and to point toward the 
specific empirical questions that may guide 
conclusions and future action. Doing so is of 
significant consequence: it aims to inform the 
extent to which low-income countries – and 
their supporters – should (or should not) invest 
priority resources in supporting and advancing 
these efforts, and related initiatives around 
Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) 
and Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). 
For some, asking this question may appear to 
risk undermining the impressive momentum of 
recent years around global reform. However, not 
to ask amounts to pouring scarce development 
resources into an uncertain enterprise for which 
we have strikingly limited existing evidence 
and, indeed, there is a mounting sense that 
low-income countries themselves are beginning 
to ask these questions.1
In theory the links between expanded information 
on beneficial ownership and improved tax 
collection are straightforward, and compelling. 
Personal wealth held abroad is frequently 
disguised from tax authorities by hiding the 
beneficial owner(s) of that wealth behind shell 
corporations. Beneficial ownership transparency 
is explicitly designed to attack this secrecy, and 
is intertwined with AEOI: beneficial ownership 
information will only be useful to developing 
country tax authorities if it is shared by the 
countries hosting wealth held abroad, while AEOI 
can only function effectively if beneficial owners 
of wealth can be identified.
Meanwhile, corporate actors may exploit a lack 
of transparency around beneficial ownership in 
order to illicitly reduce their tax liabilities. These 
strategies turn on creating the appearance that 
a transaction is occurring between two unrelated 
parties, when they are, in fact, controlled by 










1 This was a central point of discussion at the side event titled “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa: Status Quo and Challenges” 
at the First Global Conference of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax, February 15, 2018, United Nations, New York
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involves an investor seeking to take advantage 
of investment incentives reserved for foreign 
investors by making investments via a foreign 
shell corporation, for which beneficial ownership 
is obscured. In similar fashion, a local firm might 
be “sold” to a purportedly foreign investor in 
order to trigger new tax incentives. Alternatively, 
two firms owned by the same beneficial owner 
may wish to obscure their common ownership, 
in order to avoid the scrutiny of transactions 
between them for tax avoidance or evasion. In 
all cases, beneficial ownership information would 
reveal these transactions as fraudulent and allow 
more effective tax enforcement.
But while the potential role of beneficial 
ownership transparency in strengthening tax 
collection is clear, there is uncertainty about 
whether these gains are likely to be realised 
in practice by low-income countries. These 
countries may struggle both to access and 
deploy newly collected information, while the 
costs of participating, both financially and in 
terms of scarce human resources, may be 
substantial. This note suggests that, in charting 
a path forward, low-income countries and 
their supporters should ask three progressive 
questions: 
1. Is beneficial ownership information effectively 
collected and shared? 
2. Are tax administrations able and willing to use 
that information effectively? 
3. And, if those ‘links in the chain’ do not hold, 
what are the alternatives? 
In each case the answers remain unclear. The 
goal is thus not simply to identify the relevant 
questions, but to begin to identify the empirical 
evidence needed to answer them more 
meaningfully.
Is Beneficial Ownership 
Information Effectively 
Collected and Shared?
In order for the push to improve collection of 
benefical ownership information to generate 
significant improvements in tax collection, that 
information needs to be relatively complete and 
of high quality, and needs to be available to the 
tax administrations of low-income countries. 
However, achievement of these requirements 
remains uncertain, despite progress.
The first risk is that the information contained 
in national registries of beneficial ownership 
will not be of sufficient quality. If the registry 
information is not entirely accurate and verified 
it may, for example, remain possible for the 
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true beneficial owners of corporate entities to 
remain disguised, despite the appearance of 
transparency. In theory, an imperfect registry 
could nonetheless deter significant secrecy and 
abuse, owing to the heightened risk and difficulty 
of setting up such arrangements. However, it 
is equally possible that an imperfect registry 
may achieve very little if those committed to 
avoiding it find it relatively easy to do so. This 
points toward two related empirical questions for 
ongoing research:
1. How complete and accurate are emerging 
registers of beneficial ownership?
2. Insofar as registries are imperfect, are they 
nonetheless effective enough to discourage 
the use of shell companies for tax purposes?
The second risk is that even if most countries 
develop high quality registers of beneficial 
ownership, a relatively small number of 
non-compliant jurisdictions could undermine 
any aggregate impact by offering an easy 
alternative for those seeking secrecy. A 
particularly prominent risk in this respect is that 
the U.S. State of Delaware may continue to 
offer a relatively easy setting in which to register 
anonymous corporations. Even if it were to pursue 
reform, other jurisdictions may take its place: the 
larger the number of jurisdictions that increase 
transparency, the larger the potential benefits 
to those that do not.2 While funds appears less 
likely to flow through shell companies registered 
in less stable financial centers, it is nonetheless 
worth noting that many such developing countries 
may struggle to assemble accurate information 
on beneficial ownership even where they are 
committed to doing so. Given the incentives for 
some jurisdictions to resist calls for beneficial 
ownership transparency, existing efforts may need 
to be accompanied by special measures to deal 
with firms registered in non-compliant jurisdictions 
– or pressure to bring those non-compliant 
jurisdictions on board. Both, however, may 
prove challenging if the United States remains a 
prominent non-complier. This points toward three 
interconnected empirical questions:
1. Are all major jurisdictions participating 
in – and successful at implementing – the 
expanded collection and sharing of beneficial 
ownership information?
2. Insofar as there are non-participating 
jurisdictions (de jure or de facto), are there 
effective mechanisms in place to discourage 
their use for tax avoidance or evasion?
3. Insofar as there are non-participating 
jurisdictions, is there evidence of significant 
registration of shell companies in those 
jurisdictions for likely purposes of tax 
avoidance or evasion?
Finally, even if data collected is of a relatively 
high quality, and there is broad global 
participation, it will only be of significant 
value to lower-income countries if that data 










2 Elsayyad, May and Konrad, Kai. 2012. Fighting Multiple Tax Havens. Journal of International Economics. 86(2): 295-305
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Whether this will be the case remains unclear, 
but there are certainly grounds for concern. 
There is mounting worry that many developing 
countries will not immediately be able to meet 
the minimum standards for participating in the 
OECD agreement on Automatic Exchange 
of Information – while wealthier countries 
have informally made clear that they would 
be reluctant to share significant information 
until better data security is in place. In turn, 
lower-income countries have raised concerns 
that putting in place the minimum conditions 
for participation – including, potentially, building 
effective beneficial ownership registries at 
home – could be very expensive financially, in 
human resources and in compliance costs, thus 
posing a significant barrier to participation. This 
could imply an extended period during which 
low-income countries are unable to access – and 
thus benefit from – newly available beneficial 
ownership information. And, indeed, at the 
time of writing, only five African countries had 
signed up for AEOI, let alone implemented it. 
This problem would not, of course, apply in the 
case of public registers of beneficial ownership 
information – but public registries have so far 
not been promoted by the OECD, and are being 
pursued by only a small number of countries. 
This raises two empirical questions:
1. Are low-income countries successfully able 
to access the full range of relevant beneficial 
ownership information from overseas either 
via public registries or participating in 
exchanges of information?
2. Insofar as they are not participating, is 
there evidence from similar countries that 
participation is reasonably attainable, either by 
meeting minimum standards, or relaxing those 
standards – and at what cost?
Are Tax Administrations 
Able to Use Beneficial 
Ownership Information to 
Increase Tax Collection?
While there are significant challenges in 
collecting and sharing adequate beneficial 
ownership information for tax purposes, of equal 
importance is whether tax administrations are 
likely to be able to use this data effectively even 
if it is provided. To be clear, there is little doubt 
that there would be some benefit to accessing 
this data. But the magnitude of those benefits 
remains unclear, for both technical and political 
reasons.
From a technical perspective, the central 
challenge lies in the fact that access to 
beneficial ownership information is often 
designed to expose potential tax avoidance and 
evasion, but it nonetheless remains incumbent 
on national tax administrations to prove 
actual abuse. Doing so may be comparatively 
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straightforward in some cases as, for example, 
where broadly available beneficial ownership 
information reveals significant wealth held 
abroad – and untaxed – by domestic taxpayers. 
But even in those cases effective enforcement 
may require significant investigation of the 
finances of wealthy individuals, and significant 
international cooperation. Meanwhile, other 
cases may be more complex. For example, 
new data may reveal that transactions that 
appeared to be between unrelated parties were, 
in fact, conducted between firms with the same 
underlying ownership. This may, in turn, trigger 
audits to identify potential transfer mispricing and 
profit shifting. But the ultimate success of those 
efforts will be tied to the broader enforcement 
capacity of national tax agencies. While tax 
agencies are likely to reap at least some benefit, 
there are concerns that capacity to secure large-
scale revenues from international tax audits may 
remain limited for the short or medium term. This 
implies the need for specific empirical data on 
tax administrative capacities:
1. Have tax administrations demonstrated the 
capacity to prosecute and raise revenue 
in cases of individual tax evasion through 
overseas tax structures or of aggressive 
international avoidance and evasion by 
corporations? 
2. Insofar as they have not shown such capacity, 
is there empirical evidence – for example, 
from similar countries – of a reasonable 
likelihood of developing this capacity 
sustainably, at what cost and over what time 
horizon?
These technical concerns are, in turn, 
compounded by political concerns: even 
if tax administrations are technically able 
to use beneficial ownership information 
for tax enforcement purposes, will political 
authorities allow them to do so? The 
technically most straightforward use of beneficial 
ownership information, when combined with 
AEOI, will be in identifying wealth held abroad 
by wealthy individuals. However, there is now 
ample evidence that wealthy individuals are often 
shielded from more effective tax enforcement 
by powerful political supporters – or by virtue 
of being politically powerful themselves.3 
There are a variety of steps that low-income 
tax administrations could take immediately, 
domestically, to strengthen the taxation of 
wealthy individuals; if they are not already 
doing so, will access to beneficial ownership 
information change that? This political problem 
may be less acute in confronting the tax 
practices of large firms, but there is little doubt 
that some firms currently pay less taxes by virtue 
of their political connections, and beneficial 
ownership information may not substantially 
alter those political constraints. Even before 
implementing current agreements, current tax 
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3 Kangave, Jalia, Suzan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa, and Patrick Lumala Zzimbe. 2016. “Boosting Revenue Collection Through 
Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: The Case of Uganda.” ICTD Working Paper 45.
1. Are tax administrations in low-income 
countries currently making full use of 
available data from international sources in 
pursuing expanded enforcement efforts (e.g. 
international company registers, data from 
recent leaks)? 
2. Insofar as tax administrations are not currently 
making use of already available data, is this 
a technical or political problem, and are there 
reasons to believe that this would change with 
greater access to beneficial ownership data?
The extent of these technical and political 
barriers to deploying beneficial ownership 
information is ultimately an empirical question, 
and the years to come should offer important 
insights into whether or not tax administrations 
in low-income countries are successfully 
deploying beneficial ownership data to 
strengthen tax enforcement. The monitoring 
of two questions will be critical, potentially 
beginning with the handful of low-income 
countries already registered to participate in 
AEOI:
1. With expanded access to data, have 
countries, in fact, been able to identify formerly 
disguised related party transactions, and has 
this resulted in additional tax payments? 
2. Has secretive wealth held abroad been 
exposed, and has greater revenue been 
collected as a result – and have these efforts 
been broad-based, or targeted at political 
opponents?
That said, any such studies will need to 
be undertaken with care: insofar as tax 
administrations are able to use this data 
effectively, taxpayers may pre-emptively adjust 
their behavior and become more tax compliant. 
Studies that fail to account for this behavioral 
adjustment risk underestimating the benefits 
of access to beneficial ownership information. 
Researchers with detailed access to tax 
administration data may be able to assess such 
‘invisible effects’ by looking for evidence of 
increased declarations by potentially affected 
parties immediately prior to the implementation of 
data sharing.
If Beneficial Ownership 
Transparency is not 
Achieving its Goals, What 
Are the Alternatives?
There are thus a range of reasons why 
expanded collection of beneficial ownership 
information on a global level may not make 
a significant contribution to increasing tax 
collection in lower-income countries. Data 
may be of poor quality, may be undermined 
by non-compliant jurisdictions or may not 
be shared with low-income countries, while 
low-income countries may struggle to use 
even high-quality data, for both technical and 
political reasons. To the degree that any of 
these constraints undermine the likely impact of 
existing initiatives, low-income countries (and 
their supporters) may need to consider possible 
responses.
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The most straightforward potential set of 
alternatives is to clearly identify where 
the chain linking beneficial ownership to 
improved tax enforcement is breaking down 
for low-income countries, and to conduct 
targeted advocacy aimed at reforming that 
binding constraint on greater impact. Thus, for 
example, it might be that the data being collected 
is of adequate quality and completeness, and 
tax administrations would be able to use it 
effectively, but improved outcomes are prevented 
by a lack of effective data sharing toward 
low-income countries. Advocacy could target 
this binding constraint by pushing, for example, 
for stricter data sharing requirements and lower 
thresholds for low-income countries to qualify for 
access to data. Likewise, if the binding constraint 
on improved outcomes was the continued role of 
a subset of non-compliant jurisdictions, advocacy 
could target measures to incentivise compliance. 
If the key constraint is a lack of political will to 
use data effectively in low-income countries, then 
advocacy would necessarily focus on strategies 
to generate greater political pressure for 
enforcement. Of particular note is the potential 
role of public registries of beneficial ownership 
in overcoming several of the risks noted here: 
public registries eliminate problems related to 
inadequate data sharing across countries; could 
serve to generate political pressure (via civil 
society) for expanded enforcement where that 
data reveals potential abuses; and may, in some 
cases, help to overcome technical challenges by 
allowing external actors to scrutinise available 
data in search of evidence of lost revenues. Of 
course, public registries also present specific, 
and important, challenges that would demand 
careful attention.
While advocacy to address barriers to 
improved outcomes may be an attractive 
option in some scenarios, alternative 
strategies will be needed if the barriers to 
improved outcomes appear insurmountable 
in at least the short term, for either technical 
or political reasons. Insomuch as most or all 
of the constraints detailed here apply, it may be 
unrealistic to expect changes in international 
rules to be adequate to generate significant gains 
for lower-income countries. This may be true, for 
example, if assembling data of adequate quality 
proves prohibitively difficult across a sufficient 
number of countries; or if low income countries 
are unable to mobilise the technical capacity 
to make consistently effective use of available 
data. It may equally be true if further reform 
of international rules is judged to be politically 
unlikely. There may be little international appetite 
for the broad adoption of public registries in 
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the short-term, or insufficient political will to 
push non-compliant jurisdictions to expand 
meaningful collection and sharing of information 
on beneficial ownership.
Where changes to international rules appears 
to be unfeasible or inadequate, the broad 
alternative is for low-income countries 
to adopt domestic measures that seek to 
achieve similar objectives in taxing high 
new worth individuals and international 
companies. Little, if any, research appears to 
have directly addressed this question in these 
terms, and additional research, discussion 
and pilot programmes appear sorely needed. 
Ultimately, the wisdom and value of investing in 
strengthening access to beneficial ownership 
information for tax purposes depends in 
part on the potential of alternative options. It 
seems possible to imagine two broad types of 
approaches:
1. “Taxes on secrecy”: One potential option is 
to impose additional taxes on activities that 
involve assets, individuals or firms that are 
shrouded in secrecy about their beneficial 
ownership. Conceptually, the goal would 
be to collect some additional revenue from 
secretive activities, based on a presumption of 
tax evasion or avoidance, and to encourage 
legitimate activities to become more 
transparent, or to explicitly justify continued 
use of structures that obscure beneficial 
ownership. This would amount to shifting the 
burden of establishing the legitimacy of these 
structures and transactions onto taxpayers.4 
So, for example:
a) If real estate were held by a holding 
company, rather than an identifiable 
beneficial owner, higher rates of property 
tax could be applied, subject to the 
taxpayer providing adequate evidence of 
the identity of the beneficial owner.
b) Alternatively, where a firm operating 
locally transacts with a firm for which key 
information around beneficial ownership 
is unavailable (or which is registered 
in certain secrecy jurisdictions) the 
government could impose additional 
taxes (for example, a higher rate of 
withholding), impose an increased risk of 
audit, or prevent the claiming of certain tax 
incentives. 
These types of approaches are comparatively 
crude in assessing tax liabilities. But in contexts 
of limited information and capacity they may 
reduce effective inequity and inefficiency in 
existing collection, while nudging the system 
toward greater transparency. Likewise, such an 
approach would not address the entire range of 
issues targeted by global initiatives to expand 
beneficial ownership transparency. It would not, 
for example, help in cases where anonymity 
prevents wealth held abroad from being identified 
at all. But it may achieve meaningful gains within 
a subset of areas.
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2. Wider use of taxes on assets, or corporate 
revenues: A broader and less targeted 
alternative is to focus on simplified measures 
to more effectively tax groups that are at high 
risk of exploiting the international tax system 
to reduce effective tax burdens. Some recent 
research has focused on the potential role 
of alternative minimum taxes (AMTs), which 
generally levy a flat rate tax – often 1% – on 
corporate revenues for any corporation that 
declares taxable profit below a pre-defined 
threshold.5 The core logic is that firms 
declaring extremely low taxable profits, 
particularly over a series of years, are much 
more likely to be artificially reducing reported 
profits. AMTs can put a floor under those 
efforts, while leaving firms reporting profits 
above the threshold entirely unaffected. 
With respect to individuals, there is growing 
international consensus on the importance 
of strengthening property tax regimes. While 
property taxes are most commonly raised at 
a flat rate on property values, property tax 
rates could be made to rise with property 
values in order to better tax the very wealthy. 
One could, in principle, imagine alternative 
efforts aimed more explicitly at those at high 
risk of engaging in tax evasion or avoidance. 
Governments could, for example, impose 
higher rates of property taxation on owners 
of valuable properties who declare taxable 
income over time below a certain relative 
threshold. This would again shift the burden 
onto taxpayers of explaining the discrepancy 
between the value of their real estate and 
reported income in order to be exempted from 
the higher rate.
It is important to stress again that these 
proposals are, with the exception of AMTs, 
largely untested. Even AMTs have been 
subject to a still limited body of research. More 
information is needed, while any of these 
measures would encounter important political 
challenges at the domestic level. However, 
if there is evidence that beneficial ownership 
transparency may not bring immediate benefits 
to lower-income countries, there is a compelling 
case for then giving greater consideration to 
potential “second-best” alternatives that might 
deliver greater benefits at lower costs.
Finally, if low-income countries find global 
advocacy to be ineffective, but are also 
reluctant to impose the kinds of alternative 
measure noted above, they also face a third 
option: effective disengagement. In this 
scenario low-income countries, and their allies, 
may continue to offer in-principle support for 
beneficial ownership transparency – as well 
as supporting calls for reform or improvement. 
But beyond that general support, they may 
simply opt to direct scarce resources toward 
other avenues for mobilising additional revenue, 
concluding that the likely costs of investing 
5 Best, Michael, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn, and Mazhar Waseem. 2015. “Production 
versus Revenue Efficiency With Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan.” Journal of Political Economy no. 123 
(6):1311-1355.
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heavily in collecting, receiving and deploying 
beneficial ownership information are too high 
relative to potential returns. While seemingly 
straightforward, such a course of action may, in 
fact, be quite challenging: it would imply a move 
away from a large-scale global initiative that 
has been touted, in part, as promising important 
benefits to developing countries. However, if 
it becomes clear that few benefits are likely to 
accrue to (some) low-income countries in the 
short-term, effectively disengaging may be an 
appropriate strategy for redeploying limited 
resources. That said, efforts to strengthen 
beneficial ownership information also aim 
to curb corruption and money laundering, 
and those broader benefits would need to 
be included in any calculus of the costs and 
benefits of broader disengagement.
Conclusions
The past five years have witnessed wide-ranging 
and relatively ambitious reform of international 
rules shaping tax collection around the world, 
including the BEPS recommendations, AEOI, 
and measure to expand beneficial ownership 
transparency. This has been accompanied 
in many quarters by hopes of significant 
revenue gains for low-income countries, with 
a correspondingly substantial investment 
of resources – both by international actors 
and national governments – in seeking to 
implement these reform measures in practice. 
However, there has been quietly mounting 
concern that for low-income countries the 
successful implementation of new rules may 
be comparatively costly, and the benefits 
comparatively limited. This reflects limited 
resources, limited capacity and, in some cases, 
an imperfect match between international 
initiatives and the most immediate needs of 
low-income countries. Yet there is a striking 
absence of systematic and publicly available 
research evidence with which to assess the 
likely benefits (and costs) of these initiatives for 
low-income countries. It is an important moment 
at which to take honest stock of these initiatives 
for low-income countries, in order to chart the 
most appropriate way forward.
There is a striking 
absence of systematic and 
publicly available research 
evidence with which to 
assess the likely benefits 
(and costs) of these 
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